04/04/07, Jeffrey Simpson, Why Canada believes its fish story
Post
Mythologies, large and small, lie heavy across Canada, impervious to rational argument, resilient in the face of fact, blind to the experiences of others.
In a country with the world's longest coastline, we have made a hash of too many fisheries. Instead of being the leader in intelligent fisheries policies, we cling to mythologies that, in turn, have led to bad practices that more sensible countries discard.
The most tenacious mythology, especially in Atlantic Canadian fishing communities, is that fisheries must be a "common property resource," owned by all through the government and therefore available to all.
The results of this mythology are everywhere apparent: The fishery is not an industry based on economic principles, but a mixture of some economics and various forms of welfare.
It doesn't have to be this way, and it isn't this way in Iceland, New Zealand, Australia and parts of the United States. And it wouldn't be this way if Canadians followed these examples and were also inspired by the latest report from the U.S.-based organization Environmental Defence.
The organization assembled more than 30 scientists, economists and fishery specialists to analyze more than 150 peer-reviewed studies about U.S. and some U.S.-Canadian fisheries. They wanted to know how different systems performed against environmental, economic and social goals.
The conclusion: Ditch common property resource regimes and adopt what Environmental Defence calls a "catch share fishery," also called a "transferable quota system." (For the full report, see http://www.environmentaldefence.org.)
The catch share system has been studied periodically in Canada and rejected, notably by a Senate committee stacked with members from small coastal communities, and by scattered academics. Governments have been nervous of the system, fearing the political reaction, although it has already been successful in a couple of cases, such as part of the Nova Scotia scallop and B.C. halibut fisheries.
Not surprisingly, the catch share fishery does a better job raising income from a fishery and protecting stocks. As worldwide stocks decline and experts worry about their collapse, one answer is for more fisheries to adopt this system.
Under it, individual boat owners or co-operatives or communities are given a fixed share of the catch, the total of which is driven by scientific calculations. Owners can take their time catching their share, rather than every boat rushing out to catch what they can within the limited season established by government regulators (often using more and bigger equipment and trying every means to end-run the regulations).
They can buy or sell shares, creating an internal market. If a boat owner wants to get completely out of the business and retire, he can sell his share to someone else.
Market disciplines make it in everyone's interest to preserve the stock. Indeed, the Environment Defence study debunked the myth that catch share leads to systematic overfishing. On the contrary, average landings were 5 per cent below the overall limit. Catch share systems were seven times more likely than the common property resource system to be rated "well-managed" by third-party studies. "Once fisheries converted to catch shares, compliance with catch limits became standard practice," the report found.
Why is this system, which has revolutionized the fisheries of Iceland and New Zealand, so dreaded in Canada? The mythology of the common property resource is one reason, the system having been in place for so long. Another is that catch share tries to put the fishery on a sound economic basis. It provides stable, full-time employment, and, through its market principles, encourages the best fishing interests.
It does, therefore, lead to less part-time employment and some shrinkage of processing capacity in small communities. Since the fishery-cum-unemployment system in Canada is designed to maximize part-time employment, ostensibly to help fishing communities, the very economic soundness of catch share causes fright.
It caused fright in Iceland and New Zealand in the early years. There were problems in setting overall catch limits and allocating initial shares. But, eventually, the fisheries of both countries found strong economic foundations, and no one proposes going back -- back to where Canada is and for the most part has always been, gripped by one of its mythologies.
In a country with the world's longest coastline, we have made a hash of too many fisheries. Instead of being the leader in intelligent fisheries policies, we cling to mythologies that, in turn, have led to bad practices that more sensible countries discard.
The most tenacious mythology, especially in Atlantic Canadian fishing communities, is that fisheries must be a "common property resource," owned by all through the government and therefore available to all.
The results of this mythology are everywhere apparent: The fishery is not an industry based on economic principles, but a mixture of some economics and various forms of welfare.
It doesn't have to be this way, and it isn't this way in Iceland, New Zealand, Australia and parts of the United States. And it wouldn't be this way if Canadians followed these examples and were also inspired by the latest report from the U.S.-based organization Environmental Defence.
The organization assembled more than 30 scientists, economists and fishery specialists to analyze more than 150 peer-reviewed studies about U.S. and some U.S.-Canadian fisheries. They wanted to know how different systems performed against environmental, economic and social goals.
The conclusion: Ditch common property resource regimes and adopt what Environmental Defence calls a "catch share fishery," also called a "transferable quota system." (For the full report, see http://www.environmentaldefence.org.)
The catch share system has been studied periodically in Canada and rejected, notably by a Senate committee stacked with members from small coastal communities, and by scattered academics. Governments have been nervous of the system, fearing the political reaction, although it has already been successful in a couple of cases, such as part of the Nova Scotia scallop and B.C. halibut fisheries.
Not surprisingly, the catch share fishery does a better job raising income from a fishery and protecting stocks. As worldwide stocks decline and experts worry about their collapse, one answer is for more fisheries to adopt this system.
Under it, individual boat owners or co-operatives or communities are given a fixed share of the catch, the total of which is driven by scientific calculations. Owners can take their time catching their share, rather than every boat rushing out to catch what they can within the limited season established by government regulators (often using more and bigger equipment and trying every means to end-run the regulations).
They can buy or sell shares, creating an internal market. If a boat owner wants to get completely out of the business and retire, he can sell his share to someone else.
Market disciplines make it in everyone's interest to preserve the stock. Indeed, the Environment Defence study debunked the myth that catch share leads to systematic overfishing. On the contrary, average landings were 5 per cent below the overall limit. Catch share systems were seven times more likely than the common property resource system to be rated "well-managed" by third-party studies. "Once fisheries converted to catch shares, compliance with catch limits became standard practice," the report found.
Why is this system, which has revolutionized the fisheries of Iceland and New Zealand, so dreaded in Canada? The mythology of the common property resource is one reason, the system having been in place for so long. Another is that catch share tries to put the fishery on a sound economic basis. It provides stable, full-time employment, and, through its market principles, encourages the best fishing interests.
It does, therefore, lead to less part-time employment and some shrinkage of processing capacity in small communities. Since the fishery-cum-unemployment system in Canada is designed to maximize part-time employment, ostensibly to help fishing communities, the very economic soundness of catch share causes fright.
It caused fright in Iceland and New Zealand in the early years. There were problems in setting overall catch limits and allocating initial shares. But, eventually, the fisheries of both countries found strong economic foundations, and no one proposes going back -- back to where Canada is and for the most part has always been, gripped by one of its mythologies.
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